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4 Fluctuations of Social In￿uence:
Evidence from the Behaviour of
Mutual Fund Managers during
the Economic Crisis 2008/09
In this paper, I analyse the reciprocal social in￿uence on investment
decisions within an international group of roughly 2,000 mutual fund man-
agers who invested in companies in the DAX30. Using a robust estimation
procedure, I provide empirical evidence that the average fund manager puts
0.69% more portfolio weight on a particular stock, if his peers on average as-
sign a weight to the corresponding position which is 1% higher compared to
other stocks in the portfolio. The dynamics of this in￿uence on the choice of
portfolio weights suggest that fund managers adjust their behaviour accord-
ing to the prevailing market situation and are more strongly in￿uenced by
others in times of an economic downturn. Analysing the working locations
of the fund managers, I conclude that more than 90% of the magnitude of
in￿uence stems from the social learning. While this form of in￿uence varies
much over time, the magnitude of in￿uence resulting from the exchange of
opinion is more or less constant.
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4.1 Introduction
As of September 30th 2011, mutual funds worldwide had $ 9,043 billion of eq-
uity assets under management.1 This corresponds to one third of the global
investable equity opportunity set. 2 Hence, mutual fund managers’ overall in-
vestment behaviour might have a considerable impact on the dynamics of stock
prices, as similar investment decisions might drive prices into a speci￿c direc-
tion. In this context, it is important to point out how analogous decisions
arise. Mutual fund managers are institutional investors with similar invest-
ment strategies, such that it is likely that they independently make the same
decisions. However, they might also in￿uence each other such that subse-
quently investment decisions are aligned.
There is a large body of ￿nancial literature that provides empirical evidence
in favour of the latter explanation, i.e. social in￿uence among mutual fund
managers (see e.g. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2008) for a recent survey). Social
in￿uence exclusively refers to the situation where fund managers directly in-
￿uence each other. This is opposed to indirect in￿uence that for instance
arises via market price mechanisms. The empirical literature on social in-
￿uence among mutual fund managers can be divided into two main strands
depending on how fund managers learn about other fund managers’ investment
decisions. Observational in￿uence, also known as social learning, is generally
stated by the strand of literature that deals with herding behaviour (see e.g.
Lakonishok et al. (1992), Wermers (1999), Walter and Weber (2006), Oehler
and Wendt (2009) and Pomorski (2009)). The second important strand is con-
cerned with fund managers’ interpersonal communication and the resulting
1See statistics of the Investment Company Institute on www.ici.org/research/stats/
worldwide/ww_09_11.
2As of November 30th 2011, MSCI reports a market capitalisation of $ 30,057 billion
for the MSCI ACWI All Cap Index that covers approximately 98% of the global equity
investment opportunity set. Index fact sheets are available on www.msci.com/resources/.111
exchange of opinion, also known as word-of-mouth e￿ect 3 (see e.g. Shiller and
Pound (1989), Hong et al. (2005) and Pareek (2011)).
With this paper, I contribute to both strands of literature by empirically de-
termining the whole magnitude of social in￿uence among fund managers and
dividing it into observational in￿uence and in￿uence from the exchange of
opinion afterwards. Irrespective of the way the in￿uence takes place, I allow
it to be heterogeneous among fund managers. This means I do not assume
that a single fund manager is equally in￿uenced by all other fund managers.
As a major contribution, I relate both observational in￿uence as well as the
in￿uence from the exchange of opinion to the prevailing market environment,
i.e. to the state of the stock market (upturn or downturn).
In order to organise the empirical analysis, I use three hypotheses. With my
￿rst hypothesis, I state that social in￿uence among fund managers generally
represents a considerable e￿ect. By the second hypothesis, I postulate that the
magnitude of this in￿uence varies over time according to the prevailing mar-
ket environment and is lower (higher) during an economic upturn (downturn).
Looking at the di￿erent kinds of in￿uence, my third hypothesis is that only
the magnitude of observational in￿uence varies as a function of the prevailing
market situation, while the in￿uence from the exchange of opinion stays con-
stant. The theoretical foundations for the three hypotheses are outlined later
in this paper (see chapter 4.3).
For the empirical strategy, I borrow from the literature on social interaction
(see e.g. Manski (1993), Brock and Durlauf (2001), Mo￿tt (2001), BramoullØ
et al. (2009), Blume et al. (2010) and Lee et al. (2010)). A fund manager’s
action (and therefore the dependent variable within the empirical analysis)
is represented by the portfolio weight he assigns to a particular stock on a
particular reporting date. Hence, I analyse how fund managers choose the
distribution of their portfolio weights on a speci￿c date and how they get
in￿uenced by contemporaneous portfolio allocations of other fund managers.
3I use the term ￿exchange of opinion￿ in order to emphasise that information is not only
transmitted, but also discussed.112
The choice of the dependent variable is motivated by the fact that the portfolio
composition represents the relevant subset of the entirety of a fund manager’s
current opinions. The advantage of using portfolio weights is their relative
nature. They always sum up to 100% and thus are not a￿ected by the pre-
vailing market environment that could for instance lead to market-wide cash
in or out￿ows to or from the equity asset class. This is a crucial aspect for
the veri￿cation of my second hypothesis that states a relationship between the
magnitude of social in￿uence and the prevailing market environment. Unlike
quite all empirical studies before, fund managers’ trades or stock picking ac-
tivities are not considered as dependent variable within the empirical analysis.
The reason is given by the fact that both would have to be inferred by portfolio
changes. This is problematic, as portfolio holdings generally and therefore also
in the dataset of this paper are only available on a quarterly or semi-annually
basis, such that most round trip trades cannot be captured and the date on
which the trade actually took place also remains uncertain. Elton et al. (2010)
has shown that this fact strongly biases empirical results.
In order to be able to estimate the overall magnitude of social in￿uence with-
out the assumption of homogeneous in￿uence, one has to know the topology
of the underlying in￿uential network. The topology provides the information
by whom a single fund manager might or might not be in￿uenced. I do not
know the topology of the underlying network a priori, but unlike many authors
before, I do neither presume a speci￿c structure. Instead, I determine it en-
dogenously. Therefore, I empirically analyse every possible single link between
two fund managers.
After having determined the underlying in￿uential network, the overall average
magnitude of in￿uence can be estimated. Thereafter, I separate observational
in￿uence and in￿uence from the exchange of opinion by the working locations
of the fund managers. Based on Hong et al. (2005), an intra-city link between
two fund managers is de￿ned as in￿uence through the exchange of opinion,
while all inter-city links are considered to be observational in￿uence. This can
be justi￿ed as follows. Fund managers working in the same city can regularly113
meet each other, e.g. for lunch, and thereby are able to maintain a social
relationship, which facilitates an informal exchange of opinion. Fund man-
agers working in di￿erent cities of course could also exchange their opinions
via telephone or email, however, it is rather unlikely that major informal in-
formation travels via this channel. It is certainly more reasonable to assume
that most of the fund managers working in di￿erent cities don’t even know
each other personally and therefore only observe each other. Observational
in￿uence in this context cannot arise by regarding other fund managers’ quar-
terly or semi-annually reports, which although published contemporaneously
refer to a preceding period. Hence, observational in￿uence is rather based on
the expectation how other fund managers act, given their portfolio decisions in
previous periods. Nevertheless, observational in￿uence also results from pub-
lic interviews and statements of other fund managers as well as the general
market mood, which is measured by diverse investors’ opinions indices.
My dataset consists of portfolio holdings of roughly 2,000 equity mutual funds
that had invested at least $ 10 million in companies in the DAX30 index as of
December 31st 2010. For these funds, I retrieved all available portfolio hold-
ings in the period from 2002 to 2010. This time period o￿ers the possibility to
analyse di￿erent market environments, namely the economic upturn from 2002
to 2006 as well as the ￿nancial and economic crisis starting in 2007. Unlike
almost all empirical studies in this domain before, my dataset contains inter-
national investors such that the analysis of in￿uence is not limited by country
borders. This is an important aspect, because today’s media make global in-
￿uence possible. A further advantage of considering funds that invest into
companies in the DAX30 is that I obtained a quite homogenous group of fund
managers whose behaviour can be related to price dynamics of the main stock
index of Germany which is one of the most important economies in the world.
Note however that although I select fund managers according to a minimum
investment in DAX30 stocks, I analyse the social in￿uence on the investment
decisions regarding all stocks in a fund manager’s portfolio.
One drawback of the herding measure proposed by Lakonishok et al. (1992)114
is that one cannot directly distinguish between true and spurious in￿uence.
I intend to overcome this by controlling for several factors that are decisive
for portfolio selection. These control variables comprise the average historic
return, the volatility, as well as the analysts’ consensus price target, earnings
forecast and price earnings ratio of every particular stock a fund manager holds
in his portfolio. I furthermore account for the index weight of a single stock, if
it is included in one of the major global indexes. Finally, I also control for local
preferences. The database of portfolio holdings has been enriched by all these
control variables and therefore is unique. In total, 6 million portfolio weights
(of di￿erent fund managers regarding di￿erent stocks on di￿erent dates) have
been matched with stock speci￿c data of about 17,000 companies whose stocks
are held by at least one fund manager at at least one point of time.
Results show that an average fund manager puts 0.69% more portfolio weight
on a particular stock, if his peers on average assign a weight to the correspond-
ing position which is 1% higher compared to other stocks in the portfolio. The
magnitude of this social in￿uence reaches its maximum during the economic
crisis 2008/09, which suggests that fund managers are more strongly in￿uenced
by others in times of an economic downturn. More than 90% of the magnitude
of in￿uence stems from purely observing and imitating other fund managers.
While the magnitude of this observational in￿uence varies much over time, the
magnitude of in￿uence resulting from the exchange of opinion stays more or
less constant.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In chapter 4.2, I give
a brief overview of the empirical literature on social in￿uence among mutual
fund managers. I use theoretical foundations about fund managers’ behaviour
in order to derive three testable hypotheses in chapter 4.3. In chapter 4.4,
I present the empirical model and introduce a robust estimation procedure.
Chapter 4.5 serves to present the dataset used for the empirical analysis in
chapter 4.6. Chapter 4.7 sets out the checks for robustness which have been
undertaken. Chapter 4.8 concludes.115
4.2 Literature review
There are two main strands of the literature on social in￿uence among mutual
fund managers, which can be distinguished by the way a fund manager learns
about other fund managers’ behaviour. Observational in￿uence is analysed by
the strand of literature that deals with herding behaviour. A pioneer work in
this ￿eld has been presented by Lakonishok et al. (1992). With their empirical
measure, which has been applied in many studies since then, 4 they provide
weak empirical evidence for herding behaviour among US pension fund man-
agers. In a comprehensive study of a 20 years period, Wermers (1999) ￿nds
that mutual fund managers exhibit a slightly greater tendency to herd than
pension fund managers. For the German market, Walter and Weber (2006)
also detect herding behaviour among fund managers. However, they show that
a large portion of this behaviour is unintentional due to changes in benchmark
index compositions. Hence, identi￿ed herding patterns are rather spurious
caused by correlated signals. Oehler and Wendt (2009) ￿nd that German fund
managers show herding behaviour when they face market-wide cash in￿ows
or cash out￿ows. Pomorski (2009) deviates from the classical herding litera-
ture that assumes a homogeneous reciprocal in￿uence of all participants in the
market. He analyses how mutual fund managers with outstanding past per-
formance in￿uence other fund managers and provides evidence that in￿uence
on fund managers that performed poorly in the past is greater than on fund
managers with moderate past performance.
The second important strand of empirical literature on fund managers’ social
in￿uence deals with the in￿uence by the exchange of opinion. First evidence in
this domain has been provided by the survey data of Shiller and Pound (1989)
indicating that the word-of-mouth e￿ect among institutional investors plays a
considerable role. The empirical survey of Arnswald (2001) also reveals the
existence of the exchange of opinion among German mutual fund managers. A
4See Frey et al. (2006) for a brief survey of studies that used the measure of Lakonishok
et al. (1992).116
milestone is represented by the work of Hong et al. (2005) who provide empir-
ical evidence that the investment decisions of fund managers in the same city
are more similar than of those working in other cities. This still holds true after
controlling for the city speci￿c e￿ect of local preferences, such that the authors
conclude that fund managers exchange their opinions within a city based net-
work and adjust their investment decisions accordingly. Pareek (2011) relaxes
the assumption of city based homogeneous networks by assuming that fund
managers holding a large portion of a speci￿c stock maintain an informational
network link irrespective of their working location. This assumption is justi￿ed
by correlated trading behaviour that cannot be explained by style investing or
local preferences.
4.3 Hypotheses
In order to organise the empirical analysis, I set up three hypotheses based on
theoretical foundations about fund managers’ behaviour. My ￿rst hypothesis
is that social in￿uence among fund managers represents a noteworthy e￿ect.
The theoretical literature about the behaviour of mutual fund managers o￿ers
a wide range of explanations in favour of this hypothesis. 5 In his famous book
￿Irrational exuberance￿, Shiller states that fund managers’ actions are driven by
human greed and fear (see Shiller (2000)). However, there also exist several ra-
tional foundations. From the perspective of a single fund manager, other fund
managers might have or at least be assumed to have a better set of informa-
tion, which is revealed by the observation of their investment decisions ( Welch,
1992, Ellison and Fudenberg, 1993, 1995, Avery and Zemsky, 1998, Bala and
Goyal, 1998, Bikhchandani et al., 1998). Similarly, other fund managers might
be perceived to have a better ability to process available pieces of information,
5See e.g. Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) and Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) for a survey
of theoretical and empirical research on herd behaviour on ￿nancial markets or Hirshleifer
and Teoh (2008) for a more recent survey about general social in￿uence on ￿nancial markets.117
such that observing and copying their decisions is bene￿cial ( Banerjee, 1992,
Bikhchandani et al., 1992). Moreover, imitating fund managers with a high
reputation has less severe consequences in the case of a failure ( Scharfstein
and Stein, 1990, Dasgupta and Prat, 2008). Furthermore, fund managers are
remunerated according to their relative performance within a certain period
of time which usually equals one year. If they already outperformed other
fund managers in the ￿rst part of this period, they have an incentive to copy
investment behaviour of other fund managers such that relative performance
is ￿xed on the prevailing level (Maug and Naik, 1996). Eren and Ozsoylev
(2006), Stein (2008) and Gray (2010) among others give a rationale for the
exchange of opinion among participants in ￿nancial markets. Although they
are competitors, fund managers can pro￿t by sharing their methods of infor-
mation analysis that are then reciprocally enriched by the opinion and views
of the counterpart.
With my second hypothesis, I put the magnitude of fund managers’ social
in￿uence as well as the number of fund managers by whom a single fund man-
ager is in￿uenced into a perspective. I state that they both vary over time
according to the prevailing market environment and are lower (higher) during
an economic upturn (downturn). The theoretical foundation for this hypothe-
sis is as follows. In a bull market fund managers try to distinguish themselves
from their competitors in order to ￿stand out of the crowd￿ and to get a higher
remuneration (Zwiebel, 1995). In times of a bear market, fund managers fear
the loss of reputation (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990) and compensation (Maug
and Naik, 1996), such that they are more strongly in￿uenced by other fund
managers.
Looking at the di￿erent kinds of in￿uence, my third hypothesis is that only the
magnitude of observational in￿uence varies as a function of the prevailing mar-
ket situation, while the in￿uence from the exchange of opinion stays constant.
This can be justi￿ed by the fact that the number of social contacts does not
alter with the state of the market. However, afore cited aspects of reputation
and remuneration induce fund managers to align their decisions with a greater118
(smaller) number of other competitors who are not personally known to the
fund manager during an economic downturn (upturn).
4.4 Methodology
4.4.1 Estimation of the magnitude of social in￿uence
For the empirical analysis, I make use of the standard linear model to identify
social interactions based on network structures (e.g. BramoullØ et al. (2009)
and Lee et al. (2010)):6
wict = δt
X
j6=i
γijtwjct + xictβt + ict, (4.1)
where wict is the portfolio weight fund manager i puts on the stock of company
c at time t. The row vector xict contains exogenous control variables that are
decisive for the portfolio decision. The coe￿cient δt captures the magnitude
of average contemporaneous in￿uence that fund managers have on each other.
The in￿uence of a single fund manager j on fund manager i is weighted by
γijt ≥ 0.7 The weighting coe￿cients are normalised, such that
X
j6=i
γijt =
(
1 if fund manager i is inﬂuenced by at least one other fund manager
0 otherwise
. (4.2)
This ensures that δt captures the total magnitude of social in￿uence. As it is
usual in the social interaction literature, I consider strategic complementari-
ties, i.e. δt ≥ 0. This is the only assumption imposed on the coe￿cients of
6Contrary to the social interaction literature, I do not consider contextual e￿ects, i.e.
the in￿uence of an individual’s characteristics on the outcome of an other individual, as
it is unlikely that a mutual fund manager’s decisions are in￿uenced by the background of
another fund manager.
7More generally than in the social interaction literature, I do not assume that a fund
manager is equally in￿uenced by other fund managers. This means, the values of γijt do
not have to be equal for ￿xed i and t.119
the model and can be justi￿ed as follows. Consider two fund managers, where
one acts as a net buyer while the other is a net seller. Their portfolio weights
are thus negatively related, which could be expressed by a negative value of δt.
This relationship, however, does not represent a form of social in￿uence the
fund managers have on each other.
Regarding the error term of the model, I allow ict to be heteroskedastic, which
might come up by the exogenous variables xict but is also due to the bounded-
ness of the dependent variable wict between zero and one. Moreover, I assume
that the values of ict are correlated for ￿xed i and t, because by de￿nition
portfolio weights of one fund manager on a given reporting date have to sum
up to one. However, unlike in other social interaction settings (e.g. Lee et al.
(2010)), I do not assume that ict is correlated across di￿erent fund managers,
i.e. for varying i. This is justi￿ed by the fact that the group of analysed fund
managers can be considered to be homogeneous enough, such that the bias
induced by individual (unobserved) characteristics can be neglected.
For notational convenience, Equation 4.1 can be rewritten in a matrix form
wt = δtΓtwt + Xtβt + t. (4.3)
If Γt is known, then identi￿cation of the coe￿cients δt and βt is possible.
However, they cannot be consistently estimated by OLS, because from the
reduced form of Equation 4.3
wt = (I − δtΓt)
−1 (Xtβt + t). (4.4)
it follows that
Cov(Γtwt,t) = Cov(Γt (I − δtΓt)
−1 (Xtβt + t),t) = σ
2
t tr(Γt (I − δtΓt)
−1).
(4.5)
Hence, the regressor Γtwt is correlated with the error term. The problem
can be illustrated as follows. Regressing wict on wjct yields the in￿uence fund
manager j has on fund manager i plus the in￿uence fund manager i has on120
fund manager j. Hence, the estimates of the in￿uence are upwardly biased. 8 In
order to overcome this problem, Kelejian and Prucha (1998) proposed a three
step procedure that has been re￿ned by Lee (2003). As stated above, I do not
assume that the error term is correlated across fund managers. In this case,
the three step procedure reduces to a two step procedure and I proceed like in
BramoullØ et al. (2009). In the ￿rst step, Equation 4.3 is estimated by a 2SLS
estimator using the instruments Z = [ΓtXt,Xt]. In the appendix, I show that
these instruments can be used, if Xt is uncorrelated with the error term and
if the spectral radius of δtΓt is smaller than one. While the ￿rst condition is
assumed to be generally ful￿lled, the second will have to be veri￿ed after having
obtained the results. The resulting estimates of the coe￿cients λt = [δt,βt
0]0
are given by
ˆ λt = (Q
0Z(Z
0Z)
−1Z
0Q)
−1Q
0Z(Z
0Z)
−1Z
0wt, (4.6)
with Q = [Γtwt,Xt]. The second step also consists of a 2SLS estimator. This
time the instruments ˜ Z = [Γtˆ wt,Xt] are used, where ˆ wt is the consistent
estimate of portfolio weights from the ￿rst step and results by plugging in ˆ δt
and ˆ βt into Equation 4.4. Since the 2SLS estimator of the second step is just
identi￿ed, the estimates of the coe￿cients λt from the second step are given
by
ˆ ˆ λt = (˜ Z
0Q)
−1˜ Z
0ˆ wt. (4.7)
In order to account for the assumed heteroskedasticity and within portfolio
correlated error term (clustered errors), the variance of the coe￿cients is esti-
mated by
V (ˆ ˆ λt) = (˜ Z
0Q)
−1˜ Z
0ˆ Ω˜ Z(Q
0˜ Z)
−1, (4.8)
with the block matrix ˆ Ω that contains the estimates of the error variance and
the within portfolio correlation obtained by the second step.
8Lee (2002) has shown that this bias vanishes, if the overall in￿uence of an individual
is very small. This applies if the matrix Γt is dense. My results however suggest that
the in￿uential network of fund managers is sparse, such that the in￿uence of a single fund
manager indeed cannot be ignored.121
4.4.2 Determination of the underlying in￿uential network
As stated above, identi￿cation of δt and βt is possible if Γt is known. If Γt is
not given, it is still possible to make assumptions about its structure. Hong
et al. (2005) for instance assume that γijt is only di￿erent from zero if fund
manager i and j work in the same city. This is reasonable, because they are
only interested in word-of-mouth e￿ects that are more strongly expressed, if
fund managers work near by and can regularly meet each other. Pomorski
(2009) is more concerned with the in￿uence that results from observing fund
managers with high past performance. He assumes that γijt only takes values
di￿erent from zero if fund manager i showed poor past performance while
fund manager j performed well. With my paper, I intend to capture both the
in￿uence from the exchange of opinions as well as from observational learning.
For this reason, I do not impose any assumptions on the structure of Γt,
but determine it endogenously. Therefore, I estimate Equation 4.3 for every
possible combination9 of two fund managers i and j by setting
γijt =
(
1 if i = i∗ and j = j∗
0 otherwise
, (4.9)
where fund managers i∗ and j∗ are those fund managers who are under consid-
eration for the estimation of a particular combination. The in￿uence of fund
manager j∗ on fund manager i∗ is then given by δt. As stated above, Equation
4.3 cannot be consistently estimated by OLS, because the estimates of the
in￿uence from fund manager j∗ on fund manager i∗ also contain the in￿uence
in the opposite direction. The problem does not even vanish if in￿uence is
unidirectional. This is due to the fact that imposing constraint 4.9 introduces
an omitted variable problem, because the in￿uence of fund managers j 6= j∗
9In order to ensure enough degrees of freedom for the empirical analysis, I require two
fund managers to hold at least 30 stocks in common on a particular reporting date, such that
a social in￿uence might be considered. Otherwise, γijt is set to zero. This is a reasonable
approach, because the distribution of a fund manager’s portfolio weights cannot be in￿uenced
by other fund managers who hold completely di￿erent portfolios.122
is neglected. A solution consists in also applying the procedure of Kelejian
and Prucha (1998) and Lee (2003). However, the second step is not feasible,
because one would have to use the estimated weights ˆ wt that can only be
obtained if the in￿uence of all fund managers on a particular fund manager
is considered. Nevertheless, the ￿rst step can be conducted and although Lee
(2003) stated that the estimates of the ￿rst step 10 are not optimal, they are
still consistent. With the estimates of the ￿rst step, the matrix Γt is then
constructed as follows. If fund manager j∗ does not have a positive in￿uence
on investor i∗ on a 5% level signi￿cance, then γi∗j∗t is set equal to zero. Oth-
erwise, the magnitude of in￿uence is normalised through the division by the
summed in￿uence of all other fund managers j 6= j∗ on fund manager i∗ and
is assigned to γi∗j∗t.
4.4.3 Dealing with the problem of ￿zero weights￿
One remaining important question is how to deal with ￿zero weights￿. Portfolio
weights of stocks that are not held by a fund manager are implicitly equal
to zero. Considering every stock in the world, most of the elements of the
vector wt would be zero. This leads to two problems. First, it has to be
accounted for a censored dependent variable. This could either be done by
applying a likelihood technique or for instance by using the estimator proposed
by HonorØ and Leth-Petersen (2007) that does not rely on any assumption
regarding the error distribution. While the ￿rst problem thus is solvable,
there is another which is more crucial, because it induces the risk of false
inference regarding fund managers’ reciprocal in￿uence. It arises from the fact
that fund managers will have a lot of zero weights in common. This could
erroneously be interpreted as empirical evidence for strong social in￿uence
10Actually, Lee (2003) showed that the estimators of the third step in the three step
procedure proposed by Kelejian and Prucha (1998) are not optimal. However, assuming
that the error term is not correlated across fund managers, the ￿rst and the third step in
Kelejian and Prucha (1998) are equal.123
that prevents fund managers from holding particular stocks, while in truth
these fund managers might just be restricted by their investment policies not
to buy these stocks. Hong et al. (2005) try to solve this problem by restricting
the ￿universe￿ of potential investment opportunities to the stocks of the 2,000
largest companies. This reduces the problem. But the risk of false inference
is still high, if fund managers tend to hold stocks of small companies, which
leads to a lot of zero weights regarding the stocks of the larger companies.
I confront this problem by only analysing non zero portfolio weights on the
left hand side of Equation 4.3. Hence, if a particular stock is not held by a
particular fund manager on a speci￿c date, then the theoretical observation
of the resulting zero portfolio weight is dropped. This has to be kept in mind
for the interpretation of the results, because it means that the magnitude of
in￿uence only represents the in￿uence conditional on holding the stock and
putting a speci￿c weight on it. The in￿uence for not holding a particular
stock is not captured. This might restrict the generality of my conclusions.
Nevertheless, it ensures robust results, because the magnitude of in￿uence is
rather underestimated. Note that on the right hand side of Equation 4.3, the
resulting vector of Γtwt still may contain zeros, if a fund manager holds a
stock that is not held by any other fund manager on a speci￿c reporting date.
This can be illustrated by having a closer look at the structure of Γt, which is
given by
Γt =


   

0C1t×C1t γ12tMC1t×C2t ... γ1NtMC1t×CNt
γ21tMC2t×C1t 0C2t×C2t ... γ2NtMC2t×CNt
. . .
. . . ... . . .
γN1tMCNt×C1t γN2tMCNt×C2t ... 0CNt×CNt

    

, (4.10)
where 0Cit×Cit is a Cit × Cit matrix of zeros and Cit stands for the number of
stocks fund manager i holds at time t. MCit×Cjt is a Cit × Cjt matrix that is
in principle an identity matrix but the cth column is missing if fund manager
i holds the stock of company c and fund manager j does not. Considering two
fund managers, where one holds stock 1 and stock 2 and the other only holds124
stock 1, the vector of portfolio weights on the left hand side of Equation 4.3 is
given by
wt =

 

w11t
w12t
w21t

 
. (4.11)
On the right hand side, the matrix Γt has the structure
Γt =

 

0 0 γ12t
0 0 0
γ21t 0 0

 
, (4.12)
such that the product
Γtwt =




γ12tw21t
0
γ21tw11t



 (4.13)
contains zeros.
4.5 Data
4.5.1 Construction of the variables
The data regarding portfolio compositions of mutual funds has been obtained
from the Thomson Reuters ownership database. I selected only funds that
had invested at least $ 10 million in companies in the DAX30 as of December
31st 2010. For these funds all obtainable sets of portfolios compositions (not
only stockholdings of DAX30 companies) have been taken in the period from
2002 to 2010. They were available either on a quarterly or on a semi-annually
basis. Moreover, I also retrieved information about the particular fund and
the corresponding fund manager. This set of information contains the orien-
tation (active/passive) of the fund as well as the working location of the fund
manager. The ￿nal database contains 1,943 funds with 5,809,739 portfolio125
weights.11 On December 31st 2010, the total money invested by these funds
in companies in the DAX30 amounts to approximately one third of the total
DAX30 market capitalisation.
In order to properly disentangle the reciprocal in￿uence of fund managers, it
is important to ￿nd strong exogenous variables that explain their investment
behaviour (matrix Xt in Equation 4.3). Otherwise, spurious correlation might
be interpreted as intentional in￿uence. In his survey about the investment
behaviour of fund managers, Arnswald (2001) detects that investment deci-
sions regarding a particular stock are primarily based on fundamental values,
past stock returns and a general portfolio optimisation. In order to capture
these components, I enriched the database of portfolio weights by market data
obtained from Bloomberg. For 16,732 companies out of those that are held
by at least one fund manager on at least one reporting date, stock prices and
analysts’ consensus price targets as well as the mean value of the consensus
earnings forecasts referring to the three ￿scal years following a particular re-
porting date have been obtained. Moreover, the corresponding P/E ratio has
been retrieved. Comparability is ensured by converting all quotes into euro
with the prevailing exchange rates. This market data has then been matched
with the portfolio data in the following way. For every publication date of
portfolio weights in the database, the three months’ average and volatility of
daily stock returns in the preceding quarter have been calculated for all 16,732
companies and assigned to the portfolio weights that fund managers chose for
these companies. The same assignment has been done for price targets, av-
eraged earnings forecasts and P/E ratios on a given reporting date. The two
former have both been normalised through the division by the stock price, such
that these variables represent forecasted returns.
Portfolio decisions depend on fund managers’ utility functions as well as their
restrictions regarding the investment universe. A manager of a growth fund for
11In order to put these numbers into a perspective, note that in a comparable context e.g.
Hong et al. (2005) used data of 1,635 funds during a two-year period, which leads to less
than a quarter of the number of observations used in this paper.126
instance accepts a higher risk than a manager of a value fund does. Therefore,
an investment opportunity with a moderate risk and an expected return of 3%
might be attractive for the latter, while it most probably is not for the former.
This is an important issue that has to be considered, if market data shall be em-
ployed as control variables. In order to account for the individual portfolio situ-
ation of a fund manager, I relate the market data of a given stock to the market
data of all other stocks in his portfolio on a speci￿c reporting date. There-
fore, I took the di￿erence between a stock related variable and its weighted
average using portfolio weights of all other stocks that a particular fund man-
ager holds on a given reporting date. The resulting variables are DIFF_RET,
DIFF_VOLA, DIFF_PT, DIFF_EARN, DIFF_P/E and denote the di￿er-
ence of average daily stock returns, of the volatility of daily stock returns,
of normalised price targets, of normalised earnings forecasts and of the price
earnings ratio, respectively. In order to illustrate this data preparation, con-
sider an exemplary portfolio with four stocks that are weighted with 50%, 25%,
12.5% and 12.5%, respectively. The past returns of these stocks are assumed
to equal 3%, 1%, 2% and 5%, respectively. Now, the value of DIFF_RET
for the ￿rst stock is calculated by 3% − 0.25·1%+0.125·2%+0.125·5%
0.5 = 0.75%. This
means, from the perspective of this exemplary fund manager, the ￿rst stock
has a higher-than-average return. Therefore, it might appear to be attractive,
which could explain a higher-than-average portfolio weight. The calculation
of DIFF_RET for the remaining three stocks is analogous.
Turning back to the main determinants of investment decisions based on the
survey evidence of Arnswald (2001), DIFF_PT, DIFF_EARN and DIFF_P/E
account for stocks’ fundamental values. Past stock returns are captured by
DIFF_RET and portfolio optimisation is taken into account by both DIFF_RET
and DIFF_VOLA.
Walter and Weber (2006) stated that a large portion of similar behaviour
among mutual fund managers can be explained by variations of underlying
benchmark indices. Hence, a variable that captures this e￿ect is needed.
Therefore, the underlying benchmark of every fund manager has to be known.127
Among all 1,943 fund managers in the database, there are 277 who have a
passive orientation. This means these fund managers choose portfolio weights
such that they just replicate a particular index. Hence, by de￿nition they can-
not be in￿uenced by other fund managers and are excluded for the empirical
analysis. However, their portfolio weights can be used as benchmark weights
for the remaining 1,666 active portfolio managers. Therefore, I regressed the
weights of every active fund manager on the weights of every passive fund
manager. If the coe￿cient of this bivariate regression turned out to be posi-
tive and signi￿cant at a 5% level, I concluded that the weights of the passive
fund manager serve as a benchmark for the active fund manager. If there
are several passive fund managers who replicate the same index or if an index
is included in another index, the active fund manager’s portfolio weights are
likely to be signi￿cantly correlated with the portfolio weights of more than one
passive fund manager. In this case, I used all relevant benchmark portfolio
weights regarding a particular stock and took the weighted average according
to the magnitude of the bivariate regression coe￿cients. The resulting variable
is denoted BENCHMARK.
Coval and Moskowitz (1999) provided empirical evidence that fund managers
are more likely to invest in the stocks of companies that are located nearby.
In order to account for this e￿ect, I retrieved information about the location
of the headquarters for the afore mentioned 16,732 companies from Thomson
Reuters. Thereof, I created two dummy variables. CITY takes the value one
if a fund manager works in the city where the headquarters of the company,
he invested in, is located. COUNTRY equals one if the headquarter is not
located in the same city but in the same country.
4.5.2 Descriptive analysis
In order to illustrate how the group of the analysed 1,666 active fund managers
is composed, table 4.1 gives an overview of the families the funds belong to.
This list is restricted to fund families with at least 10 funds in the database.128
Table 4.2 shows the working locations of the managers of the analysed funds
by country and city. Note that the list of cities only contains those cities where
at least 10 fund managers work. Removing the portfolios weights of the pas-
sive fund managers reduces the dataset to 4,399,889 observations. Table 4.3
provides summary statistics for the corresponding variable PORT_WEIGHT
and all other afore mentioned variables. Please note that market data has been
corrected by outliers (upper and lower 1% percentiles). The mean portfolio
weight equals 0.64%. This means that on average a fund manager holds 156
stocks on a particular reporting date. Table 4.4 shows how the numbers of
funds and available portfolio weights are distributed over the period from 2002
to 2010. The average number of analysed funds per half-year equals 1,164.
This means that not all 1,666 fund managers can be examined at the same
time. Particularly, the number of fund managers that are observed in the sec-
ond half-year of 2010 is considerably lower than in the ￿rst half-year of 2010.
This is due to the fact that the data has been retrieved at the beginning of
2011, when not all funds had already reported their portfolio weights for the
end of 2010. The empirical results, however, are not a￿ected by this varia-
tion, because the magnitude of social in￿uence is determined separately for
every half-year and because it can be assumed that errors induced by missing
funds are not systematic. In table 4.5 the cross correlations of all variables are
given. As one would expect, PORT_WEIGHT is positively correlated with
DIFF_RET, DIFF_EARN, BENCHMARK, CITY and COUNTRY whereas
PORT_WEIGHT and DIFF_VOLA are negatively correlated. This suggests
that a fund manager puts more weight on stocks with higher average daily
returns, with higher analysts’ earnings forecasts, with a higher weight in the
relevant benchmark portfolio and on those stocks where he works near the
headquarter the issuing company. Less weight is assigned to stocks with a
higher return volatility. Surprisingly, PORT_WEIGHT is negatively corre-
lated with DIFF_PT, which indicates that a high return implied by analysts’
price targets leads to a lower portfolio weight of a particular stock. The price
earnings ratio does not seem to be decisive for fund managers’ portfolio se-129
Table 4.1:
Table 4.1: Overview of the fund families of the analysed active
funds
Fund Family Frequency relative Frequency
Allianz Global Investors Kapitalanlagegesellschaft mbH 82 4.9%
MFS Investment Management 42 2.5%
DWS Investment GmbH 41 2.5%
Union Investment Group 39 2.3%
Fidelity Management & Research 38 2.3%
Deutsche Asset Management Investmentgesellschaft mbH 29 1.7%
AllianceBernstein L.P. 28 1.7%
Fidelity International Limited 28 1.7%
Deka Investment GmbH 27 1.6%
ING Investment Management (Netherlands) 26 1.6%
Amundi Asset Management 23 1.4%
Templeton Investment Counsel, LLC 22 1.3%
JPMorgan Asset Management U.K. Limited 21 1.3%
Wellington Management Company, LLP 20 1.2%
UBS Global Asset Management (Switzerland) 19 1.1%
Swedbank Robur AB 18 1.1%
Newton Investment Management Ltd. 18 1.1%
BNP Paribas Asset Management S.A.S. 16 1.0%
Aberdeen Asset Management (Edinburgh) 15 0.9%
Schroder Investment Management Ltd. (SIM) 15 0.9%
Invesco Advisers, Inc. 14 0.8%
La Banque Postale Asset Management 14 0.8%
AllianceBernstein Ltd. (Value) 13 0.8%
Henderson Global Investors Ltd. 13 0.8%
M & G Investment Management Ltd. 12 0.7%
OppenheimerFunds, Inc. 12 0.7%
Franklin Mutual Advisers, LLC 12 0.7%
BlackRock Investment Management (UK) Ltd. 11 0.7%
Danske Capital 11 0.7%
Dexia Asset Management Belgium S.A. 11 0.7%
Aviva Investors France S.A. 10 0.6%
Natixis Asset Management 10 0.6%
The list of fund families is restricted to those with at least 10 funds in the database.130
Table 4.2:
Table 4.2: Overview of the working locations of the analysed active
funds
Country Frequency rel. Frequency City Frequency rel. Frequency
United States 448 26.9% London 261 15.7%
Germany 332 19.9% Frankfurt 255 15.3%
United Kingdom 306 18.4% Boston 136 8.2%
France 147 8.8% Paris 134 8.0%
Switzerland 65 3.9% New York 107 6.4%
Sweden 49 2.9% Stockholm 48 2.9%
Canada 43 2.6% Zurich 43 2.6%
Netherlands 40 2.4% Edinburgh 41 2.5%
Belgium 37 2.2% Brussels 36 2.2%
Italy 37 2.2% Milan 33 2.0%
Luxembourg 29 1.7% Toronto 32 1.9%
Denmark 27 1.6% Luxembourg 28 1.7%
Ireland 22 1.3% The Hague 26 1.6%
Japan 16 1.0% Copenhagen 23 1.4%
Spain 16 1.0% Dublin 22 1.3%
Bahamas 12 0.7% Cologne 22 1.3%
Norway 9 0.5% Chicago 22 1.3%
Austria 8 0.5% Denver 16 1.0%
Australia 4 0.2% Tokyo 16 1.0%
Portugal 4 0.2% Geneva 12 0.7%
Finland 3 0.2% Madrid 12 0.7%
South Africa 2 0.1% Los Angeles 12 0.7%
Liechtenstein 2 0.1% Short Hills 12 0.7%
n.a. 2 0.1% Nassau 12 0.7%
Singapore 2 0.1% Puteaux 11 0.7%
Hong Kong 1 0.1% Fort Lauderdale 11 0.7%
Greece 1 0.1% San Francisco 10 0.6%
Taiwan 1 0.1% Munich 10 0.6%
Bermuda 1 0.1%
1,666 100%
The list of cities is restricted to those where at least 10 active fund managers work.131
Table 4.3:
Table 4.3: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
PORT_WEIGHT 0.006396 0.012125 0.000000 1.000000 4,399,889
DIFF_RET -0.000364 0.002410 -0.012611 0.007152 3,679,430
DIFF_VOLA 0.000477 0.000790 -0.005347 0.006336 3,679,431
DIFF_PT -0.018298 0.194100 -0.854410 1.337569 3,109,250
DIFF_EARN -0.003905 0.035997 -0.152663 0.185215 2,801,973
DIFF_P/E -0.130618 11.708073 -64.667999 75.106094 2,786,845
BENCHMARK 0.000240 0.001264 0.000000 0.159050 3,724,983
CITY 0.028229 0.165625 0.000000 1.000000 3,796,512
COUNTRY 0.157178 0.363968 0.000000 1.000000 4,399,889
The portfolio weight an active fund manager puts on a speci￿c stock at a particular point
time is given by PORT_WEIGHT. DIFF_RET, DIFF_VOLA, DIFF_PT, DIFF_EARN,
DIFF_P/E denote the three months’ average daily stock return, the three months’ volatil-
ity of daily stock returns, the normalised price target, the normalised three years average
earnings forecast and the price earnings ratio, respectively, minus the corresponding portfo-
lio speci￿c weighted mean value. BENCHMARK represents the portfolio weight a speci￿c
stock receives in the average benchmark portfolio of passive fund managers that is relevant
for a particular active fund manager. CITY and COUNTRY are dummy variables. CITY
equals one if an active fund managers works in the same city as the company whose stock
he holds. COUNTRY is equal to one if an active fund manager does not work in the same
city but in the same country as the company whose stock he holds.132
Table 4.4:
Table 4.4: Temporal distribution of the number of funds and
portfolio weights
N K
2002/I 122,120 851
2002/II 139,790 949
2003/I 144,382 965
2003/II 160,395 1,029
2004/I 167,069 1,007
2004/II 203,472 1,102
2005/I 211,041 1,084
2005/II 242,202 1,169
2006/I 248,259 1,201
2006/II 272,548 1,263
2007/I 274,041 1,261
2007/II 301,352 1,398
2008/I 332,090 1,401
2008/II 323,982 1,427
2009/I 342,310 1,461
2009/II 383,330 1,482
2010/I 311,922 1,082
2010/II 219,584 824
sum / mean 4,399,889 1,164
N is the number of available portfolio weights per half-year that are provided by K fund
managers.133
Table 4.5:
Table 4.5: Matrix of Cross Correlations
Variables PORT_WEIGHT DIFF_RET DIFF_VOLA DIFF_PT DIFF_EARN DIFF_P/E BENCHMARK CITY
DIFF_RET 0.058
(0.000)
DIFF_VOLA -0.082 0.079
(0.000) (0.000)
DIFF_PT -0.018 -0.219 0.191
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DIFF_EARN 0.043 -0.114 0.130 0.305
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DIFF_P/E -0.001 0.058 -0.043 -0.127 -0.316
(0.199) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BENCHMARK 0.233 0.009 -0.051 -0.010 0.034 -0.022
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CITY 0.075 0.006 0.010 0.004 0.022 -0.000 0.004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.734) (0.000)
COUNTRY 0.037 -0.007 0.004 0.047 -0.030 -0.021 0.026 -0.080
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
The portfolio weight an active fund manager puts on a speci￿c stock at a particular point
time is given by PORT_WEIGHT. DIFF_RET, DIFF_VOLA, DIFF_PT, DIFF_EARN,
DIFF_P/E denote the three months’ average daily stock return, the three months’ volatil-
ity of daily stock returns, the normalised price target, the normalised three years average
earnings forecast and the price earnings ratio, respectively, minus the corresponding portfo-
lio speci￿c weighted mean value. BENCHMARK represents the portfolio weight a speci￿c
stock receives in the average benchmark portfolio of passive fund managers that is relevant
for a particular active fund manager. CITY and COUNTRY are dummy variables. CITY
equals one if an active fund managers works in the same city as the company whose stock
he holds. COUNTRY is equal to one if an active fund manager does not work in the same
city but in the same country as the company whose stock he holds. The table contains the
correlation coe￿cients. P-values are reported in parenthesis.134
lections as the corresponding correlation coe￿cient is almost zero and not
signi￿cant on a 10% level.
4.6 Results
4.6.1 Determination of the underlying in￿uential network
In the following, I test the three hypotheses of the paper. Therefore, I deter-
mine the magnitude of social in￿uence among fund managers, divide it into
observational in￿uence and in￿uence from the exchange of opinion and relate
it to the prevailing market environment. First, I select the variables that are
relevant for the portfolio selection. The correlation coe￿cients provided in
the preceding chapter all showed the expected sign, except for DIFF_PT and
DIFF_P/E. In order to capture correctly the fundamental component, di￿er-
ent speci￿cations with the three fundamental variables are tested within an
OLS panel regression with fund manager ￿xed e￿ects. The results are shown
in table 4.6. It can be seen that DIFF_EARN has the highest relevance, such
that I use the variables of the third speci￿cation for the analysis of in￿uence.
I estimate the coe￿cients of Equation 4.3 for every half-year from 2005 to
2010. The years from 2002 to 2004 are skipped, because the number of avail-
able earnings forecasts in the database is too low. 12 For every half-year, I
further remove all funds where less than 30 portfolios weights have been avail-
able. This ensures enough degrees of freedom for the empirical analysis. As
described in chapter 4.4, the matrix Γt is determined by pair-wise regres-
sions. Therefore, PORT_WEIGHT is used for wt and the columns of the
matrix Xt consist of the variables DIFF_RET, DIFF_VOLA, DIFF_EARN,
BENCHMARK, CITY, COUNTRY as well as of a row vector of ones in order
to introduce a constant term. Remember that the matrix of instruments is
given by Z = [ΓtXt,Xt]. If however, some variables are identical for the two
12Removing the variable DIFF_EARN and including the years 2002 to 2004 qualitatively
leads to the same results.135
Table 4.6:
Table 4.6: OLS panel regression with fund manager ￿xed e￿ects
Speci￿cation I Speci￿cation II Speci￿cation III Speci￿cation IV
DIFF_RET 0.14133∗∗∗ 0.12958∗∗∗ 0.15040∗∗∗ 0.13368∗∗∗
(0.00204) (0.00193) (0.00187) (0.00187)
DIFF_VOLA −0.67585∗∗∗ −0.65888∗∗∗ −0.70066∗∗∗ −0.64053∗∗∗
(0.00647) (0.00606) (0.00597) (0.00583)
DIFF_PT −0.00081∗∗∗ −0.00005∗
(0.00003) (0.00002)
DIFF_EARN 0.01112∗∗∗ 0.01130∗∗∗
(0.00015) (0.00013)
DIFF_P/E −0.00001∗∗∗ −0.00002∗∗∗
(0.00000) (0.00000)
BENCHMARK 1.20364∗∗∗ 1.08347∗∗∗ 1.21971∗∗∗ 1.23161∗∗∗
(0.00496) (0.00401) (0.00482) (0.00486)
CITY 0.00272∗∗∗ 0.00288∗∗∗ 0.00269∗∗∗ 0.00269∗∗∗
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003)
COUNTRY 0.00128∗∗∗ 0.00121∗∗∗ 0.00122∗∗∗ 0.00114∗∗∗
(0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002)
CONST 0.00556∗∗∗ 0.00553∗∗∗ 0.00552∗∗∗ 0.00545∗∗∗
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
N 2,160,103 2,536,435 2,331,492 2,312,400
The dependent variable is given by the portfolio weight an active fund manager puts on a
speci￿c stock at a particular point. DIFF_RET, DIFF_VOLA, DIFF_PT, DIFF_EARN,
DIFF_P/E denote the three months’ average daily stock return, the three months’ volatil-
ity of daily stock returns, the normalised price target, the normalised three years average
earnings forecast and the price earnings ratio, respectively, minus the corresponding portfo-
lio speci￿c weighted mean value. BENCHMARK represents the portfolio weight a speci￿c
stock receives in the average benchmark portfolio of passive fund managers that is relevant
for a particular active fund manager. CITY and COUNTRY are dummy variables. CITY
equals one if an active fund managers works in the same city as the company whose stock
he holds. COUNTRY is equal to one if an active fund manager does not work in the same
city but in the same country as the company whose stock he holds. The table contains
the regression coe￿cients βt that result from the estimation of equation 4.3 with δt = 0 by
an OLS panel regression with ￿xed e￿ects on the fund manager level. The signi￿cance of
coe￿cients is indicated by stars (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01). The corresponding
standard deviations are reported in parenthesis.136
fund managers under consideration, then the columns of Z will be collinear.
This can be demonstrated by the constant term that by de￿nition always is a
column vector of ones. The matrix of instruments can be written as
Z = [Γt[X
(1−6)
t ,c],[X
(1−6)
t ,c]], (4.14)
with c being a column vector of ones. The matrix X
(1−6)
t contains the six
variables (DIFF_RET, DIFF_VOLA, DIFF_EARN, BENCHMARK, CITY,
COUNTRY) as explained above. Now, Equation 4.14 can be reformulated as
Z = [ΓtX
(1−6)
t ,Γtc,X
(1−6)
t ,c]. (4.15)
The rows of Γt are normalised, such that the single row elements sum up to
one. This yields Γtc = c. Hence, the 7th and the 14th column of matrix Z are
identical and thus collinear. This problem of colinearity might also occur for
the variables BENCHMARK, CITY or COUNTRY, if fund managers have the
same benchmark or work in the same city or country, respectively. In order to
rule out the potential problem, I use the instruments Z = [ΓtX
(1−3)
t ,Xt], where
the matrix X
(1−3)
t only consists of the variables DIFF_RET, DIFF_VOLA and
DIFF_EARN that are guaranteed to be individual for every fund manager as
they depend on the speci￿c portfolio compositions. Regarding the timing of
possible in￿uence, I assume that fund managers can only be in￿uenced by
other fund managers if they publish their portfolio weights within the same
month. Moreover, I require them to hold at that time at least 30 stocks in
common, because the distribution of a fund manager’s portfolio weights cannot
be in￿uenced by other fund managers who hold completely di￿erent portfolios.
Furthermore, I do not examine the reciprocal in￿uence of funds that belong to
the same fund family, as this does not represent a form of external in￿uence.
The overall average density of the resulting network equals 0.65%. On average,
59% of the links connect fund managers within the same world region (e.g.
Europe, North America, etc.). 22% of the links represent relationships between
fund managers working in the same country, while 8% of the links are due to
intra-city connections.137
4.6.2 Estimation of the magnitude of social in￿uence
After having obtained the matrix Γt, the two step procedure outlined in chap-
ter 4.4 can be applied in order to estimate the coe￿cients δt and βt for every
half-year. The vector wt and the matrix Xt are de￿ned as explained above for
the determination of Γt. This time however, I use Z = [ΓtX
(1−6)
t ,Xt] as the set
of instruments, where X
(1−6)
t contains the same column as Xt except the vector
of ones. This choice is justi￿ed by the fact that not all fund managers neither
have the same benchmark, nor work in the same city or country, respectively,
such that only the column vector of ones could generate a collinearity. The
estimation results are shown in table 4.7. It can be seen that all values of δt are
lower than one. As the matrix Γt is row normalised by Equation 4.2, i.e. the
single row elements sum up to one, the spectral radius of δtΓt is also always
lower than one. Hence, the instruments used for the estimation procedure are
valid (see appendix).
The average estimate of the coe￿cient δt equals 0.6878. This means that if
a portfolio position is 1% higher weighted by the relevant fund managers of
the underlying in￿uential network, then a particular fund manager also puts
0.69% more weight on the relevant stock compared to other stocks in his portfo-
lio. The magnitude of social in￿uence might appear to be higher than results
of other empirical studies suggest. Hong et al. (2005) for instance obtain a
value of 0.13. Wermers (1999) ￿nds that if 100 fund managers trade a par-
ticular stock in a quarter, then approximately 3 more funds would trade on
the same side of the market in that stock than would be expected if stocks
were choosing randomly. However, afore cited authors analyse fund managers’
trades and stock picking behaviour and therefore examine changes of portfolio
weights that occur during one quarter, while my study aims to shed light on
the distribution of portfolio weights on a speci￿c date. Moreover, Hong et al.
(2005) only determine the magnitude of social in￿uence that arises from the
exchange of opinion, while I also consider observational in￿uence.
Among the variables that are decisive for the portfolio selection, BENCH-138
Table 4.7: Table 4.7: Estimation results for the magnitude of social in￿uence
δt DIFF_RET DIFF_VOLA DIFF_EARN BENCHMARK CITY COUNTRY CONST N/K
2005/I 0.6804∗∗∗ 0.1973∗∗∗ −2.9388∗∗∗ 0.0037∗∗∗ 0.9845∗∗∗ 0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0063∗∗∗ 30,965
(0.0206) (0.0250) (0.1539) (0.0011) (0.0760) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) 415
2005/II 0.7809∗∗∗ 0.1567∗∗∗ −0.9084∗∗∗ 0.0096∗∗∗ 1.1204∗∗∗ 0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0052∗∗∗ 132,884
(0.0226) (0.0119) (0.1333) (0.0010) (0.1502) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 901
2006/I 0.6645∗∗∗ 0.0444∗∗∗ −1.1161∗∗∗ 0.0117∗∗∗ 2.0421∗∗∗ 0.0017∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0053∗∗∗ 140,871
(0.0170) (0.0140) (0.0841) (0.0008) (0.1782) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 895
2006/II 0.6516∗∗∗ 0.1056∗∗∗ −0.8132∗∗∗ 0.0104∗∗∗ 1.1843∗∗∗ 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0049∗∗∗ 169,451
(0.0106) (0.0077) (0.0647) (0.0009) (0.1183) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 967
2007/I 0.6867∗∗∗ 0.1735∗∗∗ −1.8908∗∗∗ 0.0164∗∗∗ 1.1092∗∗∗ 0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0050∗∗∗ 179,348
(0.0143) (0.0104) (0.0785) (0.0009) (0.2454) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 961
2007/II 0.6606∗∗∗ 0.2970∗∗∗ −1.1007∗∗∗ 0.0156∗∗∗ 0.3769∗∗∗ 0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0054∗∗∗ 207,838
(0.0097) (0.0058) (0.0327) (0.0007) (0.0649) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 1,116
2008/I 0.6654∗∗∗ 0.1564∗∗∗ −1.0590∗∗∗ 0.0067∗∗∗ 1.2108∗∗∗ 0.0028∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0050∗∗∗ 249,314
(0.0087) (0.0043) (0.0169) (0.0003) (0.0545) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 1,237
2008/II 0.7693∗∗∗ 0.2170∗∗∗ −0.3005∗∗∗ 0.0028∗∗∗ 1.2342∗∗∗ 0.0027∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0050∗∗∗ 234,275
(0.0100) (0.0036) (0.0090) (0.0003) (0.0659) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 1,262
2009/I 0.7095∗∗∗ 0.0646∗∗∗ −0.6326∗∗∗ 0.0045∗∗∗ 2.3453∗∗∗ 0.0028∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0048∗∗∗ 255,197
(0.0092) (0.0039) (0.0118) (0.0002) (0.1217) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 1,369
2009/II 0.7247∗∗∗ 0.1393∗∗∗ −1.0176∗∗∗ 0.0093∗∗∗ 0.7959∗∗∗ 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0045∗∗∗ 303,547
(0.0082) (0.0039) (0.0174) (0.0002) (0.0471) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 1,411
2010/I 0.5917∗∗∗ 0.0726∗∗∗ −0.9350∗∗∗ 0.0101∗∗∗ 1.0187∗∗∗ 0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0043∗∗∗ 247,488
(0.0099) (0.0043) (0.0180) (0.0003) (0.0579) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 957
2010/II 0.6571∗∗∗ 0.1344∗∗∗ −1.2916∗∗∗ 0.0081∗∗∗ 1.3203∗∗∗ 0.0019∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0047∗∗∗ 172,590
(0.0173) (0.0058) (0.0309) (0.0003) (0.0787) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 698
mean 0.6878 0.1466 -1.1668 0.0091 1.2282 0.0024 0.0011 0.0050 193,647
The dependent variable is given by the portfolio weight an active fund manager puts on a
speci￿c stock at a particular point. DIFF_RET, DIFF_VOLA, DIFF_EARN, denote the
three months’ average daily stock return, the three months’ volatility of daily stock returns
and the normalised three years average earnings, respectively, minus the corresponding port-
folio speci￿c weighted mean value. BENCHMARK represents the portfolio weight a speci￿c
stock receives in the average benchmark portfolio of passive fund managers that is relevant
for a particular active fund manager. CITY and COUNTRY are dummy variables. CITY
equals one if an active fund managers works in the same city as the company whose stock he
holds. COUNTRY is equal to one if an active fund manager does not work in the same city
but in the same country as the company whose stock he holds. N represents the number of
observation and K the number of fund managers used in the empirical analysis. The table
contains the regression coe￿cients δt and βt of equation 4.3 that are obtained by the two
step estimation as explained in the text. The signi￿cance of coe￿cients is indicated by stars
(* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01). The corresponding standard deviations are reported
in parenthesis.MARK has a considerable e￿ect. The corresponding average coe￿cient of
1.2282 is greater than one, which thus suggests that portfolio managers gen-
erally hold fewer stocks than are included in all relevant indices. Therefore,
variations in the benchmark portfolio translate into higher variations in an
individual portfolio. Moreover, on average, an increase of DIFF_RET and
DIFF_EARN and a decrease of DIFF_VOLA each by one standard deviation
leads to an increase in portfolio weights by 0.04%, 0.03% and 0.09%, respec-
tively. Interestingly, the regression coe￿cients for DIFF_VOLA are consid-
erable smaller in the second half-year of 2008 and the ￿rst half-year of 2009,
which results from the high volatility most of the stocks experienced during
that period of time. Fund managers tend to put 0.02% more portfolio weight
on stocks, if they work in the city where the headquarters of the issuing com-
pany is located. 0.01% more portfolio weight is chosen, if not the city but at
least the country is equal. The resulting variations appear to be low. However,
remember that the average portfolio weight equals 0.64%. The afore presented
results show that after controlling for the key determinants of the portfolio
selection, the e￿ect of social in￿uence among fund managers is statistically
and economically signi￿cant. This corroborates my ￿rst hypothesis.
4.6.3 Fluctuations of social in￿uence
Table 4.8 shows the evolution of the network density over time. The network
density is de￿ned by the number of all network links given by Γt divided by
the number of all possible network links. The number of all possible links is
given by K(K−1), where K is the number of fund managers that are analysed
in a particular half-year. Following Hong et al. (2005), I de￿ne the in￿uence
between fund managers that work in the same city as in￿uence from the ex-
change of opinion. Table 4.8 also provides the fraction of the total density that
is due to links that connect fund managers in the same city. The relevance of
the in￿uence from the exchange of opinion can be expressed more precisely, if
every intra-city link is weighted with the corresponding coe￿cient γijt. The140
Table 4.8:
Table 4.8: Network dynamics
num all links
num all possible links
num unweighted city links
num all links
num weighted city links
num all links
2005/I 0.58% 7.7% 10.75%
2005/II 0.60% 10.9% 11.28%
2006/I 0.53% 9.2% 9.38%
2006/II 0.59% 9.5% 9.15%
2007/I 0.59% 8.3% 8.42%
2007/II 0.55% 9.2% 9.45%
2008/I 0.62% 7.9% 8.49%
2008/II 0.64% 9.8% 7.16%
2009/I 0.85% 7.2% 7.64%
2009/II 0.92% 7.0% 7.94%
2010/I 0.76% 7.6% 7.30%
2010/II 0.53% 7.7% 6.50%
mean 0.65% 8.49% 8.62%
The ￿rst column displays the total network density. The second column shows the portion
of network density that is generated by intra-city links. The third column also contains the
portion of network density resulting from intra-city links, however, every link is weighted
with the corresponding coe￿cient γijt.
resulting weighted fraction of the total density is also displayed in table 4.8.
The mean network density equals 0.65%. This means the underlying in￿uential
network is very sparse. On average, a particular fund manager is in￿uenced
by 6.6 other fund managers. The mean portion of weighted and unweighted
network links that connect fund managers within the same city are quite sim-
ilar and equal 8.49% and 8.62%, respectively. Hence, 8.49% of the average
network density is due the intra-city links and 8.62% of the average magnitude
of social in￿uence results from intra-city in￿uence. The latter means that, on
average, a fund manager increases the portfolio weight of a particular stock
by 0.06%, if the fund managers with whom he exchanges his opinion increase141
the corresponding portfolio weight by 1%. It can be stated that the portion
of intra-city in￿uence decreases slightly over time, which could be due to the
e￿ect of increasing globalisation.
In order to test the second and third hypothesis, the magnitude of social in-
￿uence and the density of the underlying in￿uential network are related to the
prevailing market environment represented by the dynamics of the DAX30.
Figure 4.1(a) shows the magnitude of in￿uence as well as the network density.
Figure 4.1(b) displays the magnitude of in￿uence that is due to fund managers
working in the same city as well as the network density resulting from links
between those fund managers. In ￿gure 4.1(c) the price level of the DAX30
and the volatility of daily returns for every half-year during the period of anal-
ysis are shown. One can see that the magnitude of in￿uence has been at a
stable level of about 0.67 since 2006. A sudden increase can be observed at
the beginning of the recent economic crisis in the second half-year of 2008,
where the level of the DAX30 was low and the volatility of stock returns was
high. As the bottom line of the DAX30 level was reached and returns began
to get positive again, the magnitude of in￿uence decreased to below the level
experienced before the crisis and returned to this level in the second half-year
of 2010. Surprisingly, there is a singular peak in the magnitude of in￿uence in
the second half-year of 2005 that does not correspond to a speci￿c evolution
of the DAX30. The density of the underlying in￿uential network remained
stable on the level of about 0.59% between 2005 and 2008. It began to grow
signi￿cantly in the ￿rst half-year of 2009 and returned to the pre-crisis level in
the second half-year of 2010.
The temporal variations of the magnitude of social in￿uence provide empirical
evidence in favour of my second hypothesis. During the period until the begin-
ning of the economic crisis in 2008 as well as in 2010, social in￿uence among
fund managers was considerably lower than during the crisis. This suggests
that fund managers try to di￿erentiate from their competitors during an eco-
nomic upturn in order to get a superior remuneration. During an economic
turndown, however, they fear the loss of reputation and consequently of re-142
Figure 4.1: Figure 4.1: DAX30 related ￿uctuation of social in￿uence
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(a) Average magnitude of in￿uence and overall network density. (b) Magnitude of in￿uence
that is due to fund managers working in the same city and network density of those fund
managers. (c) Price level of the DAX30 and volatility of daily DAX30 returns.143
muneration, such that they are more prone to align their portfolio decisions
with other fund managers. This theory is also supported by the evolution of
the network density. At the beginning of the crisis, fund managers were only
in￿uenced by those fund managers by whom they had also been (less strongly)
in￿uenced before. During the crisis, the number of fund managers by whom a
particular fund manager was in￿uenced increased notably. This led to a mar-
ket wide alignment of portfolio weights, which could be based on afore cited
e￿ects of reputation and remuneration.
Now, turning to the third hypothesis, I intend to shed light on the temporal
￿uctuation of the in￿uence from the exchange of opinion, de￿ned as social
in￿uence among fund managers that work in the same city. It can be stated
that the magnitude of in￿uence as well as the network density is more or less
constant over time. This means that the increase of in￿uence and the enlarge-
ment of the in￿uential network during the crisis are not due to an increase of
in￿uence from the exchange of opinion. This is in line with the argumentation
that interaction with social contacts does not vary with the prevailing mar-
ket environment, such that variations are due to ￿uctuations of observational
in￿uence most probably for motives of reputation and remuneration.
4.7 Robustness checks
In order to rule out the possibility that the results presented in the previous
chapter are driven by factors that are not related to the presented explanations,
I provide some robustness checks. A key factor that potentially could lead to
biased results is that the underlying social network is determined endogenously.
Thereby, only the in￿uence from those fund managers with correlated portfolio
weights is considered. Moreover, this in￿uence is a priori weighted with the
corresponding coe￿cients from the pair-wise regressions. As a ￿rst robustness
check, I repeated the empirical analysis with an exogenous network, i.e. a
given presumed network which is not just determined within the empirical
analysis. Therefore, I assumed that a fund manager can be in￿uenced by any144
Table 4.9:
Table 4.9: Robustness checks: Temporal mean values of the
magnitude of social in￿uence δt for di￿erent speci￿cations
whole period bear market bull market di￿erence
(I) min. 30 com. st. (standard) 0.6859 0.7376 0.6687 0.0689
(II) min. 30 com. st., exog. netw. 0.9346 0.9743 0.9214 0.0529
(III) min. 15 com. st., endog. netw. 0.7867 0.8423 0.7681 0.0742
(IV) min. 100 com. st., endog. netw. 0.5157 0.5446 0.5060 0.0385
Speci￿cation I represents the standard model used for the empirical analysis of this paper.
Speci￿cation II is based on an exogenous network as explained in the text. Speci￿cations III
and IV are used to vary the minimum number of stocks two fund managers have to hold in
common, such that they could potentially in￿uence each other. The corresponding minimum
numbers are 15 and 100. In the ￿rst column, the overall temporal mean values of regression
coe￿cients δt measuring the magnitude of social in￿uence are displayed. The second and
the third columns show the corresponding temporal mean values for the bearish market en-
vironment (2008/II, 2009/I, 2009/II) and the bullish market environment (remaining period
of analysis). In the last column, the di￿erences of average social in￿uence between the two
di￿erent market environments are presented.
other fund manager with whom he holds at least 30 stocks in common. I kept
the restriction regarding the minimum number of common stocks, because
fund managers can only (intentionally) align their portfolios, if they have a
minimum intersection of stocks. In order to illustrate this fact, consider two
fund managers that only share one common stock. The weight of this stock
depends on the weights of all other stocks in the respective portfolios, such that
a correlation of these single stock’s weights could only be spurious. In order
to overcome the potential bias that could result by weighting the in￿uence of
fund managers di￿erently, I chose equal weights for every fund manager. The
results can be seen in table 4.9 (speci￿cation II). The overall average coe￿cient
of social in￿uence equals 0.9346. This is by far higher than the magnitude of
social in￿uence obtained by the standard model in the previous chapter and
indicates that my results are not upwardly biased through the usage of an
endogenous network. Having a closer look at the dynamics of social in￿uence,145
I compared the mean value of the coe￿cients obtained for the second half-
year of 2008 and both half-years of 2009 (bearish market environment) with
the temporal average of the coe￿cients obtained for the remaining period of
analysis (bullish market environment). The di￿erence equals 0.0529 and is
only slighter lower than the di￿erence found by applying the standard model
amounting to 0.0689 (see speci￿cation I in table 4.9). Hence, even if one does
not trust the absolute values of social in￿uence, temporal variations attest a
relative di￿erence between the periods of bull and bear markets.
In order to provide further robustness checks, I varied the minimum number
of stocks that two fund managers have to hold in common, such that they
could potentially in￿uence each other. First, I reduced this number to 15.
Thereafter, I augmented it to 100. The results are also shown in table 4.9
(speci￿cations III and IV). The di￿erence of social in￿uence between the two
market environments equals 0.0742, if 15 common stocks are requested and
amounts to 0.0385, if the threshold is set to 100. Hence, speci￿cation III leads
to a higher di￿erence of social in￿uence compared the standard model, while
speci￿cation IV yields a lower di￿erence. This is in line with the explanations
provided in the proceeding chapter. The number of minimum common stocks
controls the number of fund managers by whom a particular fund manager is
assumed to be potentially in￿uenced. The more fund managers are considered
to in￿uence a particular fund manager, the higher is the measured magnitude
of in￿uence in case of a market wide portfolio alignment. Hence, the di￿erence
of social in￿uence between the two states of the economy which resulted to
be higher for a smaller threshold can be interpreted as evidence in favour of a
market wide portfolio alignment during an economic downturn.
4.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I analysed the social in￿uence on portfolio decisions that fund
managers investing in DAX30 companies have on each other. I ￿rst determined
the underlying in￿uential network by examining every possible link between146
two fund managers. The constructed network resulted to be very sparse. Using
a two step estimation procedure, I then estimated the magnitude of in￿uence.
On average, a fund manager puts 0.69% more portfolio weight on a particu-
lar stock, if the fund managers in his reference group assign a weight to the
corresponding position which is 1% higher compared to other stocks in the
portfolio. Looking at intra-city in￿uence, I found that 8.62% of the total in-
￿uence is based on the exchange of opinion.
Relating the in￿uence among fund managers to the dynamics of the DAX30, I
concluded that fund managers adapt their behaviour to the prevailing market
situation. In times of a bull market, fund managers rather try to di￿erentiate
themselves from their competitors. During a bear market, they are more prone
to align their portfolio weights with the others. These behavioural patterns are
most probably due to reputational reasons and e￿ects of remuneration. This
is in line with the fact that the in￿uence from the exchange of opinion, de￿ned
as intra-city in￿uence, does not alter with the prevailing market environment.
The empirical ￿ndings of this paper regarding the behaviour of fund managers
can be taken into account while creating remuneration schemes in order to
avoid negative outcomes that might result from a herding behaviour during a
market downturn.147
Appendix
In this appendix, it shall be shown that the instruments Z = [ΓtXt,Xt] can
be used to estimate Equation 4.3 by a 2SLS estimator, if Xt is uncorrelated
with the error term and if the spectral radius of δtΓt is smaller than one.
The endogenous regressor Γtwt can be expressed by the reduced form Equation
4.4 in the following way
Γtwt = Γt (I − δtΓt)
−1 (Xtβt + t). (4.16)
If the spectral radius of δtΓt is lower than one, the Neumann expansion can
be used and leads to
Γtwt = Γt
 
I + δtΓt + δ
2
tΓt
2 + ...

(Xtβt + t). (4.17)
If Xt is not correlated with t, it thereof follows that ΓtXt is a valid instrument
for Γtwt, because it is correlated with Γtwt, but does not have a direct impact
on wt, as it does not appear in Equation 4.3.148
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